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B employed A, a real estate agent, to sell a piece of her
land, authorizing him to sell it for $I 5,5oo, and promising to
Agent to Sell
Land,
Contract,
Commissions

pay him $500 of the purchase price.

A found a

purchaser for the sum of $15,25o and B signed

the following memorandum: " I hereby ratify
sale of my lot this day made by A for the sum of
$14,8oo net to me." Owing to a defect in the title, the sale
was not completed and the purchase money was never paid.
The Supreme Court of California held that, under the modified agreement, there was no promise to pay any commissions,
that A's only recourse was to keep the difference between the
sum he should receive for the land and the $14,8oo, and that,
therefore, in the absence of a sale, he could not recover anything for commissions from B, his principal: Ford v. Brown
et al, 52 Pac. 817.
A real estate broker earns his commissions when he finds a
purchaser who will buy on terms satisfactory to his client.
Commissions

A contemplated purchase which fails through no
fault of his client is not enough: Montgomery v.

Knickerbocker, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 128.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

In State ex rel. State Bar Ass'n v. Finn, 52 Pac. 756, the
Supreme Court of Oregon gives an interesting discussion of
an attorney's duty toward the court, and shows
Attorney,
Fraudulent the difference between merely clever practice on
the one hand and dishonest tricks on the other.
Practices,
Disbarment In this case the attorney had presented
affidavits
before the court which were not really signed by those whose
names appeared, while in other affidavits the signatures were
genuine, but they appeared over his jurat as notary public,
when it was shown that the parties had not sworn in his
presence.
Although the contents of the affidavits were substantially
true and no harm had been done, since the case was decided
on other grounds, the court thought that its dignity would be
438
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conserved by disbarring the attorney for a year. "Such reckless demeanor by an attorney is not consistent with professional
ethics or obligations, and constitutes, as we are lead to conclude,
wilful misconduct in his profession."
When a party appears in a case and is represented by an
attorney of record, he cannot interfee in the conduct of the
case, and any agfiderents or stipulations made
Client,
with the opposite side by the party himself will be
Powerto
Interfere In disregai ded by the court. Defendant's time to
Conduct of put in his answer had expired and judgment had
Cas e
been entered against him by default. On a motion to open the judgment it appeared that plaintiff, without
the knowledge of his counsel, had granted to defendant an
extension of time. Held, that the order of the court denying
the motion was proper, since plaintiff had no power to act:
Wyllie v. Sierra Gold Co., 52 Pac. (Cal.) 809.
An attorney employed by his client to conduct a criminal
prosecution is liable for an improper arrest when he personally
Malicious swears to the information on which the warrant is
Prosecution issued : Whitney v. New York Casualty Ins. Ass'n
(Supreme Court, App. Div. N. Y.), So N. Y. Suppl. 227.
CARRIERS.

A railroad company which issues a through ticket, and so
contracts to carry a passenger beyond its own terminus,
Connecting constitutes the connecting carrier its agent for
Lines,
the performance of the contract of carriage, and
Liability for is liable for the injury caused by the negligence of
Negligence
such connecting carrier: Omaha R. V. R. Co. v.
Crow (Supreme Court of Nebraska), 74 N. W. io66.
Plaintiff purchased a ticket, with a return coupon, being
informed by the ticket agent that the evening train would stop
at the place of her destination so that she would
Failure to
Owing to the negligence of the
StopTrain, be carried back.
Special
division superintendent, the evening train was not
stopped, and plaintiff was put to great inconveniContract
ence in returning.
The Appellate Court of Indiana held that she could recover
from the railroad in an action of tort. Although a passenger
is bound by all the rules of a railroad in regard to the running
of the trains, yet where a special contract is made (which the
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court held to be present in this case) the company is liable for
failure to stop the train in accordance with the special agreement, even though it is not within the implied authority of a
ticket agent to change the duly established rules of the
company for the stoppage of its passenger trains: E. & . H.
R. Co. v. Wilson, 50 N. E. 90.
In an action for damages for personal injuries suffered by
the plaintiff while travelling in defendants' train, it appeared
Injury to that the plaintiff was sitting in defendants' dining
Passenger,
car on an unfastened chair, such chairs being
Negligence, usually used on defendants' and other railroads.
Evidence
In going around a curve, the car gave a sudden
lurch, which overturned the chair and injured the platniiff.
The train was not running at an unusual rate of speed, and
the road bed was in good condition. Held, that negligence
could not be inferred, and it was error to submit the question
to the jury: Nelson v. Lehigh Val. R. Co. (Supreme Court,
App. Div. N. Y.), 5o N. Y. Suppl. 63.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A statute of the State of New York (Laws 1897, c. 506)
prohibits the sale of tickets for passage on railroads or vessels
Anti-Scalping by persons not the authorized agents of the carriers,
authorizes the purchase by the agents of given lines
Statute,
Invasion of of tickets over other lines to provide for through
Personal and transportation, and requires carriers to redeem
Property
Rights,
Tickets,

Redemption

u used tickets purchased from their agents. In
People v. Warden of City Prison (Supreme Court,
App. Div. N. Y.), 50 N. Y. Suppl. 56, the court

has made a sweeping decision, in which it holds (I) That a
person excluded by the statute from the business of buying
and selling such tickets is not deprived of any right under
Art. I, § I, of the State Constitution, which provides that no
member of the state shall be deprived of any of the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of
the land or the judgment of his peers; (2) That the statute,
in prohibiting any such person from engaging in such business,
does not deprive him of liberty or property without due process of law, within the purview of the Constitution of New
York, Art. I, § 6, or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; (3) That the statute, in prohibiting sales of such tickets by any person other than the agents
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of the carriers, does not discriminate against any ciass of
citizens, thereby denying citizens the equal protection of the
laws within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: (4) That such ticket being
merely the evidence of a contract of carriage, and not, the
contract itself, and that since, under the statute, a purchaser
may redeem an unused ticket, the statute .does not impair the
obligation of a contract; (5) The statute does not, in confining
the business of buying and selling tickets to the agents of the
carriers, create a monopoly; (6) It does not invade the exclusive power of Congress to control interstate commerce.
In the absence of a federal statute or treaty to the contrary, a
state court has jurisdiction of an action ex contractzit by a white
Contract with man against an Indian belonging to a tribe and a
Indian
particular reservation: Stacy v. La Belle (Supreme
Court of Wisconsin), 75 N. 'W. 6o.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, recognizing the rule that
when the legislature of one state adopts the statute of another
state it likewise adopts the construction which
Statutes,
that statute has received by the highest court of
such state, by a parity of reasoning has reached
the conclusion that where a law, which has been interpreted
by the supreme court of a state, is re-enacted by the iegislature of the same state, such interpretation is thereby adopted:
State v. Clorndl, 75 N. W. 25.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that a statute of the
Territory of Utah providing for conviction and punishment for
adultery is valid, even though there is a similar
Territories,
Criminal statute of the Federal Government which refers to
Statutes,
the same crime and applies to the inhabitants of
Validity
the territories. The Act of Congress is not
exclusive and does not forbid the territorial legislature from
acting on the same subject.
Nor does the Utah Statute violate the constitutional inhibition against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
That inhibition does not operate as to the act, but as to the
offense, and an offense in legal significance is the transgression
of a law. Although each government has the legal right to
convict and punish for the same act, yet it is probable that
punishment in one jurisdiction would be a ground for relieving
the offender from punishment in the other: State v. Norman,
52 Pac. 986.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

Zane, C. J., dissents on the ground that the territorial and
the Federal Statutes both punish crimes against the United
States, since the origin of both statutes is the federal sovereignty, and that offenses against each statute would therefore be the " same offense."
CONTRACTS.

An action was brought to recover damages for breach of a
contract to furnish sufficient water power to run the machinery
of a mill. The Court of Appeals of New York
Breach,
Measureof
held that the measure of damages was the differDamg1es,
ence between the rental value of the mill and
Profits
machinery with the power contracted for and its
rental value with the power actually furnished.
The value of the profits which would probably have resulted
to plaintiff, had defendant performed his contract, could not be
considered in estimating the damages, because (i) they are too
dependent upon numerous and uncertain contingencies to
constitute a trustworthy measure of damages; (2) the loss of
profits is the remote and not the direct result of the breach of
contract; (3) the engagement to pay for loss of profits in case
of default is not part of the contract, nor was it within the
contemplation of the parties: Witiherbee et al. v. '11'yk'r. ;o
N. E. 58.
Where the parties to a contract have agreed to express
themselves in a written lease, the mere fact that the lease was
Contractto

never

formally executed

does

not prove that

there was no contract. In this case the terms
of the contract were fully expressed in telegrams and
letters which passed between the parties, but one of them
refused to sign the formal lease when called upon to do so
under the agreement. He was held liable for his failure to
perform the contract, just as if he had executed the lease:
Post v. Davis, 52 Pac. (Kan.) 903.
Make Lease

CRIMINAL LAW.

A newspaper made a violent attack on the members of the
Supreme Court of Washington, charging them with dishonest
Libe on

practices and using language which was clearly

libellous per se. Held, that the court had power
to attach and punish the editor for contempt,
through its power both under the common law
and under the Washington Statute, 2 Ball. Cod. § 5798. The
Court,

Contempt,
Punishment
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constitutional provision that every person may write and speak
freely, etc., does not apply to a publication which amounts to
contempt of court under the common law: State v. Tugwell,
52 Pac. (Wash.) 1056.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Swift v. Witchard, 29
S. E. 762, decided that Simply making an affidavit before a
justice -of-the -peace, charging one with a crime,
Malicious
Prosecution when not followed up by an arrest, does not
render the prosecution, even if malicious and without probable
cause, actionable.
The California Penal Code, § 269, provides that in a prosecution for seduction, marriage of the parties prior to the filing
Prosecution of an information or the finding of an indictment
for Seduction, for such offense is a bar to the prosecution thereof.
However, the mere fact that the defendant was
Offer ol
Marriage
"ready and willing to marry the prosecutrix, and
his failure to so marry was by reason of her refusal " is no bar
to the action because "the woman is not compelled to condone
the offense by marrying the man and thus freeing him from
the penalties of the law:" People v. H-ough, 52 Pac. (Cal.) 846.
DECEDENT'S ESTATES.

By the will of testator, appellant and respondent were
appointed executors. Appellant renounced his acceptance in
writing, but before letters had been granted to

respondent he retracted his renunciation. Held,
that appellant was not bound by his renunciation
Contractnot since it may be retracted at any time before letters

Renunciation,
Retraction,

Executorship have been granted to another.

Held, also, that an agreement not to apply for
letters cannot be enforced, since it is against public policy: In
re True's Estate, 52 Pac. (Cal.) 815.
E2UITY.

Where a vendor enters into agreements with his vendees
whereby the latter agree not to sell at less than the list price,
injunction, an injunction will issue to prevent a person, who
has knowledge of such agreement, from buying
Breach of
from such vendees at less than list price, but the
Contract
vendor must prove that the purchase is to be actually at less
than list price: L. E. Waterman Co. v. Waterman, 50 N. Y.
Suppl. 13 1.
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In Meerrtti v. Williamson, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 113, the
plaintiff asked for an order for the examination of the defendant
in order to enable the plaintiff to frame his bill of

complaint. It was held that such an order would
not be granted unless the affidavit of the plaintiff
clearly showed he was not already possessed of the requisite
information.
Examination

UVIDUNCE.

In an indictment for bigamy the second marriage was
proved, but the first still remained in controversy. Held,
that the second wife was not competent as a
Bigamy,
Second Wife's witness to prove the marriage of defendant with
his first wife, nor would she be competent even to
Testimony
prove the second marriage, unless the first was clearly established: Lowery v. People, 5o N. E. (Ill.) 165.
In an action against the receiver of a railroad for injuries
caused by the negligence of trainmen, statements of the engineer whose negligence was alleged were made
Hearsay,
Resoesti,

under the following

circumstances:

After the

accident the train proceeded to a station three
miles distant and returned, with the coroner and jury, to the
place of the accident, three hours after it had happened. The
engineer then made the statements which were offered in
evidence by the plaintiff to prove his negligence in running
the train.
Held, that the statements were inadmissible, since they
were mere narratives of a past transaction and not part of the
res gesto, nor were they admissions, because they were not
made by one who stood in such representative relation to the
receivers as to be binding upon them: Walker et al. v.
O'Connell, 52 Pac. (Kan.) 894.
Admissions

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in O'Brien v. City of
La Crosse, 75 N. W. 8 1, has recently rendered a decision on
the vexed question whether, in the absence of
Physical
Examination, statute, the defendant in an action for personal
Right to
injuries has the right to a personal examination of
Compel
the injured party by physicians or experts. In
this case the court held that such right was not absolute, but
rested in the sound discretion of the court. (See note in this
issue.)
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In a trial for murder the identity of a certain oil can
produced in court was a material circumstance in the case.
Question by During the examination of a witness as to his
Trial Judge, knowledge of the can and the time when he had
Improper seen it, the trial judge said to the witness, "I
Form
believe that is the same can?" The witness
replied, "Yes, sir; I believe it is."
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that if it- had been but
a mere question put by the court to the witness, it would have
been unobjectionable; but that under the circumstances, the
question, coming as it did from the presiding judge, would be
likely to cause the witness (who appeared to be an ignorant
man) to believe that he was expected to identify the can in
the manner indicated, and it was therefore a reversible error:
Marzen v. People, 5o N. E. 249.
In an action against a municipality for injury by negligence,
a verdict was rendered for $2537.50.
In the jury room,
after the jury were discharged, there were found a
Verdict,
Presumption number of small pieces of paper with different sums
of Arrival by written on them, also a large sheet with twelve
Chance
different amounts ranging from $ioo to $500o.
The sum of these was divided by 12, and the quotient appearing on the paper was $2537.50, the exact amount of the
verdict.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the foregoing facts
were not sufficient to raise a presumption that the jury had
previously agreed to arrive at their verdict in the manner
above indicated; therefore it could not be impeached: City
of Columbus v. Ogletree, 29 S. E. 749. Lumpkin, J., dissented.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In Nebraska a married woman is not liable on a note unless
she intended to render her separate estate liable, or gave it
with reference to her separate property, trade or
Married
~omen's business, or upon the faith and credit thereof, nor
Contracts does the mere signing of a note raise a presumption of the existence of such collateral facts: State Bank v.
Smith, 75 N. W. (Neb.) 5 '. The same principle was applied
to an effort to convert a married woman's deed into a mortgage in First Nat. Bank of Sutton v. Grossham, Ib. 5 i.
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INSURANCE.

In Lampkin v. Travelers' Ins. CO., 52 Pac. (Col.) 1040, the

application for an

accident policy contained the clause:

"Write policy payable . . . to B, whose relationtions,
Warranty,

ship to me is that of wife."

On suit by B against

the insurance company it was shown that although

deceased lived with B as man and wife, yet he had
another wife living at the time, and that he
was
aware of the fact.
Held, that the statement in the policy was neither a warranty nor a material representation, and its falsity did not
render the policy void. Since B lived with deceased as his
wife, she had a reasonable right to expect some pecuniary
advantage from the continuance of his life, and therefore she
had an insurable interest in his life.
Insurable

Interest

MASTIER AND SERVANT.

In Rupprecht v. Brighton Mills, 5o N. Y. Suppl. 157, it was

decided that the doctrine of obvious risks was not applicable
Action for
where the plaintiff is not connected with that
Negligence
which causes the injury. Therefore a complaint
aginst

by one employed in a building for injuries sus-

Sufficiency of

tained by falling through an elevator shaft is

Master,

Complaint

sufficient, though it does not allege that

the

employer knew that the elevator was defective, or that the
employe was ignorant of such fact, where his duties were not
connected with the elevator.
In Gareoy v. King, 5o N. Y. Suppl. I8o, it was decided that
where a servant is ordered to go on the roof to remove
snow and falls through a skylight and is killed,
Assumption
of Risk by
there can be no recovery if the deceased knew of
Servant

the skylight, or should have known of it and

nevertheless went on the roof; and this, although the
deceased was free from contributory negligence. The question
is not whether there was contributory negligence, but whether
the risk was assumed.
MORTGAGIES.

Under the law of Nebraska the title to mortgaged chattels
remains in the mortgagor until foreclosure.
In a recent case in that state a physician had
Chattel
Mortgage,
mortgaged a buggy, which he retained and used
Common Law in his business.
One clause in the mortgage was
Lien
that the mortgagor should not use the buggy
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negligently or improperly so as to subject it to probable loss
or material depreciation. The buggy was taken by the doctor
without the consent or knowledge of the mortgagee to a
carriage company for certain repairs. The bill f6r repairs not
being paid, the carriage company held the buggy, claiming a
common law lien for their services. The mortgagee replevied.
It was proved at the trial that the mortgagee had knowledge
of the fact that the buggy needed repairing from time to time,
and had, on one occasion, at least, seen it left at the shop for
repairs.
The court held that the common law lien was superior to
the lien of the chattel mortgage, because the recital in the
mortgage, and the facts proven, disclosed that the mortgagor
had at least implied authority to have repairs made : Drummond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 74 N. W. 966.
Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. C. 5 14, has definitely settled in
England, and generally, the rule that a prior mortgagee takes no
priority over a subsequent mortgagee as to adAdvances vances made by him after knowledge of the
second mortgage. It is well settled in this country that the rule has no application to the case where the
prior mortgagee is bound by contract to make the subsequent
advances, and the same decision was recently reached in
England in West v. Williams [1898], I Ch. 488.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The duty imposed on a municipality of keeping its highways
clear of incumbrances is a private one, and its agents employed
to perform it are the agents of the municipality in
LAsbinty for its private capacity; and for their acts within the
scope of their duty, the municipality is civilly
liable: Scott v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York (Supreme
Court, App. Div.), 5o N. Y. Suppl. 19o.
NEGLIGENCE.

The New York Supreme Court, in Meenagz v. Buckmaster,
50 N. Y. Suppl. 85, laid down the following qualification to
Imputing
Driver's
Negligenceto
Passenger

the rule that the negligence of a driver is not to
be imputed to the passenger, the court saying,
"The general rule that the negligence of a driver
of a vehicle is not to be imputed to a passenger

therein, who at the time has no authority to direct his move-

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

NEGLIGENCE (Continued).

ments or control his actions, is subject to the qualification that
it is the duty of the passenger, where he has the opportunity
to act, to learn of the danger and avoid it if practicable." If
the passenger neglects to do this he is chargeable with contributory negligence for continuing to ride with a careless
driver.
In Quigley v. H. W. Johns Mfg. Co., 50 N. Y. Suppl. 98,
an owner of a building let an upper story to A, who made
alterations therein. A later ceased to be a tenant.
Landlord and
A lower story was rented to the plaintiff's intesTenant,
Alteration of tate. The alterations made by A, it was alleged,
Portion of the occasioned a collapse of the building, which killed
the plaintiff's intestate. In a suit against the
1Tenement
owner for negligence it was held, that it was the owner's duty
on gaining possession not to suffer the continuance of any
condition created by a former tenant which he knew occasioned,
or had reasonable cause to believe would occasion, danger to
plaintiff's intestate; and, also, that the landlord might well be
held to a higher degree of care than the tenant.
In the absence of malicious intent, a sheriff is not liable for
damages for the death of a prisoner caused by a lawless mob,
although he was warned of the outrage intended,
Lynching,
and was present, and offered no resistance thereto:
Liability of
State v. Wade (Court of Appeals of Maryland),
Sheriff,
Sureties

40 Atl. 104.

The sureties on a sheriff's bond are not liable for the acts
of the sheriff in maliciously aiding a mob to lynch a prisoner
in his charge: Ibi.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

In Oppenheimer v. West Side Bank, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 148,
a deposited with defendant a " raised" check, which was
credited to him and collected from drawee bank.
Cheek,

Genuineness,

Warranty,

Estoppel in
Pais

The depositor was informed that it was

"all

right," whereupon he paid the same to the person
from whom he received the check.

The raising

being discovered, and the amount being claimed

from him by defendant in a suit to recover it, it was held:
(i) The plaintiff, as endorser and holder of the check, and
claiming to receive the amount thereof from the drawee, warranted the premiums of the instrument and of every preceding endorsement: Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, i Hill, 287
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(1841); Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N. Y. 230 (1850).
(2) The drawee bank can only be held to a knowledge of the
signature of the drawer, and vouched only the genuineness
of that signature, and cannot be held to a knowledge of the
want of genuineness of any other part thereof, or the bona
fides of the holder: Bank v. Banking Association,. 55 N. Y.
211 (1 873) ; Whie v. Bank, 64 N. Y.

36 (1 8&76)

(3): Money

paid upon a raised check may be recovered, provided the one
seeking to recover has not, by his careless or negligent act,
prejudiced the person from whom recovery is sought.
The vexed question as to the responsibility of a bank with
whom a draft has been deposited for collection in a distant
city, when a loss occurs through the failure of the
Draft
Deposited for correspondent bank, has again been decided by
Collection, the Appellate Court of Indiana: Irwin v. Reeves
Correspof.

Pulley Co., 50 N. E. 317.

The majority of the

court held to the sound rule that the bank of
deposit is not liable for the laches of its suo-agent,
if it has used due care in the selection of its correspondent
bank, since the depositor is presumed to know that such is
the custom, and to have given an implied assent to the employment of a sub-agent.
Robinson, C. J., and Comstock, J., dissented on the ground
that since the depositor kept an account with the bank of
deposit and gave it all his business in collecting drafts, etc., a
valid contract existed, in consideration of the above, by which
the depositing bank undertook absolutely to collect the draft
and return the money.
dent,
Liability

Plaintiff held a note of A, which B and C signed as sureties.
After the maturity of the note, A made a new one payable to
plaintiff in the same form as the original one, and
Forged
Signatures, forged B's and C's signatures as sureties on the
Promise to second note. It was shown that B and C had
Pay,
several times verbally promised to pay plaintiff
Estoppel
under the mistaken apprehension that the forged
signatures were genuine. On suit against B and C, it was
held that they were not estopped from denying the forgery of
their signatures, since it was not shown that plaintiff" was in
any way prejudiced by them, or that they induced him to do,
or to omit to do, anything whatever to his disadvantage, or
that his status by reason thereof was in any respect changed:"
Barry v. Kirkland et al., 52 Pac. (Ariz.) 771.
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N'orthrup v. Cheney, 5o N. Y. Suppl. 389. In an action
by holder for value of a promissory note against maker and
endorser it appears that the notice of non-payNotice of
Dishonor,
ment and protest served on the endorser deMisdescription scribed the note as being dated November I I,
1893, instead of November 1, 1895. Held, that in the abscnce
of evidence showing that the endorser was misled as to the
identity of the note, the notice was not vitiated.
As a general rule, notice must contain (I) a fair description
of the bill dishonored; (2) an intimation of the fact of dishonor; (3) the name of the person giving notice, or by whose
authority it is given.
In American Boiler Co. v. Fontham, 50 N. Y. Suppi. 35 1,
the defendant was sued by payee of a draft accepted by
Payee andAc- defendant in the following words: "Accepted,
ceptor,
and I agree to pay the sum specified herein within
Failure of
sixty days from date." The defense was that the
Consideration drawer did not complete a certain contract with
the defendant, thus producing a partial failure of consideration for the acceptance. The defense was overruled on the
familiar principles that, by his acceptance, the defendant became the principal debtor, and that the failure of consideration cannot affect a payee who takes without notice of the
failure: Davis v. McCreaay, 17 N. Y. 230 (1858).

PARENT AND CHILD.

Defendant enticed away plaintiff's minor daughter and
induced her to live at his house. While she was there, she
was debauched by defendant's son, for which
Enticing
It was not
away Child, seduction this action was brought.
Seduction,
shown that the defendant connived at his son's act,
Probable
nor that he even knew of it, and the court refused
to find as a matter of law that he was negligent in

not knowing of it.
Held, that since a person is responsible for the consequences
of his faults only so far as they are natural and proximate and
since the damages sustained by the debauchment of plaintiff's
daughter were remote, and not the proximate cause of the
wrongful enticing away, a judgment for defendant was properly
rendered: Stewart v. Strong, 50 N. E. (Ind.) 95.
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A testator by his will bequeathed his estate to trustees in
trust to pay the income to his children in equal shares, the
shares of the daughters to be for their separate
use, and not by way of anticipation, .and after
Advancements,
their decease, to their children; but if there
should be no child or children of such daughters who should
attain twenty-one years, then the share ofsuch -daughters should
at their decease go over to other uses therein set forth. The will
also contained this clause: " It shall be lawful to apply in or
towards the advancement in life of each child of mine a sum
not exceeding five hundred pounds of his or her presumptive
share, such sum to be paid, if my trustees shall think fit, to any
daughter of mine, notwithstanding her share is settled, and my
trustees shall be the sole judges of the advisability of such payment and of what the term advancement in life may signify."
The testator left surviving him two daughters, both of whom
attained twenty-one. One daughter, B, married after attaining
her majority, and the trustees at her request advanced two
hundred and fifty pounds to her under the above power, with
knowledge that the sum so advanced was to be used to pay a
debt due from her husband to one of the trustees.
It was held that this was not a bona fide exercise of the
power and, therefore, not good as against the children of the
daughters who were entitled in remainder. The court intimated
that in its opinion the words "advancement" and "presumptive
share" were, in the absence of controlling words to the
contrary, referable to the period of minority, of the daughters.
and that an advancement to any of them after majority was
not in accordance with the terms of the power; but the
decision was put on the broad ground that while the powers
given to the trustees under the will were very sweeping, still
an advance to a daughter whose share was held in trust for
her separate use, for the purpose of paying her husband's debts,
could in no sense be construed as a bona fide advance for her
advancement in life: Molyneux v. Clark [1898], I Q. B. 648.
By a marriage settlement in 1793, a fund was settled in
trust for husband and wife successively for life, with remainder
Appointment,. to such of their children as they should, by deed,
appoint. In 1835, there being then seven chilValid
Execution,
dren living, including three unmarried daughters,
Rule Against the husband and wife executed a deed appointing,
Perpetutles inter alia, out of the fund fifteen hundred pounds,
to be paid to each of the three unmarried daughters "who
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shall hereafter marry;" so long as the three daughters or any
of them should be living and unmarried, the income of the
residue of the fund under the settlement should be paid to
them, or such of them as should from time to time be living
and unmarried, equally; and "in case one or two only of
them should marry" (which was the event that happened),
that then, after the death or marriage of such one as should
be last living and unmarried, the capital of the residue should
be paid to the four other children and such of the three
unmarried daughters " as should marry as aforesaid," equally.
It was held, (i) that the ultimate gift over of the residue was
void for remoteness, as the class was not necessarily ascertainable within twenty-one years after the death of the survivor
of the appointors; (2) that the appointment of the three sums
of fifteen hundred pounds to the daughters was also void, as
the daughters might not marry until more than twenty-one
years after the death of the survivor of the appointors ; (3) that
the gift of the income of the residue of the fund to the three
unmarried daughters was a valid appointment to each daughter
as long as she was living and unmarried: ]n re Gage [1 898],
i Ch. 498.
QUASI-CONTRACTS.

In the Court of Appeal, Sumpter v. Hedges [1898], 1 Q. B.
673, the plaintiff, a builder, who had contracted to erect certain
Abandonment buildings on defendant's land for a lump sum,
of Contract,

Recovery on

Qantum
Mlerult

after he had done part of the work, abandoned the

contract, and defendant thereupon completed the
buildings. Held, that the plaintiffcould not recover
from the defendant in respect of the work which

he had done, as upon a quantum meruit, there being no
evidence of any fresh contract to pay for the same: IkMarres v.
Butt (1858), 8 E. & B. 738, followed. See, also, Cutter V.
Powell, 6 T. R. 320 (1796).
REAL PROPERTY.

A lessor executed a lease under seal to lessee for a term of
fourteen years, covenanting, inter alia, to finish laying down
oo acres of the leased premises in good English
Covenantby
Lessor,

grass within a year.

The lease contained also this

Liability for declaration "that their shall not be implied in this
Breach after lease any covenant or provision whatever on the
Lessor's
part of either of the parties hereto." The lessor
Death
failed to comply -with his covenant, and died
within the year.
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In an action for damages by the lessee for breach of covenant, it was held that the covenant must be construed as
qualified by the subsequent declaration above recited and that,
therefore, the covenant did not run with the reversion, and the
liability for the breach thereof should be borne by the testator's
general estate, and not by the specific devisees of the reversion
of the lease. The court further declatd: that eveir if there had
been no qualifying declaration, and the covenant ran with the
reversion, still it would not be a charge thereon primarily, but
that as between the specific devisees of the reversion and the
general estate, the latter should be primarily liable for breach
of a covenant which was not incident to the relation of landlord and tenant, but rather preparatory thereto: Eccles v.
Ml'tler [1898], A. C. 360.
A and B were adjoining land owners. A, being about to
build, executed an agreement with B to the effect that A's wall
Covenants should be built equally upon each land, and B,
Running with his heirs and assigns, should, whenever they might
desire to use the wall, pay one half of its value.
the Land,
Party walls There was a special stipulation in the agreement
that the covenant should run with the land. By various
mesne conveyances A's property passed to plaintiff and B's to
defendant. Plaintiff brings this action for one half the price of
the wall, against defendant who had made use of it in the
erection of a building.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the covenant
was merely personal between A and B .and did not run with
the land so as to bind defendant: Sebald v. .Mulholland,50
N. E. 260.
A sold a house and lot to plaintiff and afterwards sold an
adjoining lot to defendant. When the latter was about to
build, and thus cut off plaintiff's light and air, an
Easements
injunction was sought, which was refused.
and
Light
of
In affirming the decree the Supreme Court of
Air,
California gives an excellent review of the American
American
authorities on the subject of easements of light
and air and shows conclusively that the English doctrine was
never adopted in this country. It is now definitely settled
that California is in line with the other states, nor is the rule
changed (as regards the present case) by Civ. Code, § i io4,
which provides that a transfer of realty " creates an easement
to use other realty of the grantor in the same manner and to
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the same extent as such property was obviously and
permanently used by him:" Kennedy v. Burnap et al., 52 Pac.
843.
The lessee of a public house covenanted with the lessor that
he, his executors, administrators and assigns, "would not
wilfully do or suffer any act or thing which might
Lease,
Covenant,
be a breach of the rules and regulations established
Assignee,
by law for the conduct of licensed public houses,
Under-Lessee or be a reasonable ground for the
withdrawing or
withholding of all or any of the licenses for the sale of beer
and ale, wine and spirituous liquors therein."
The lessee assigned the term to the defendants, who sub-let
the premises for a short period of the term vested in them to
E, who committed an offence against the license laws, the
result of which was that the renewal of the license was refused.
The lessor having sued the assignee of the lessee for breach of
covenant, it was held that the breach was committed by E, the
under-lessee, and not by the assignee, and that, therefore, the
defendant was not liable for breach of the covenant: Bryant
v. Hancock & Co. [1898], I Q. B. 716.
In Mason Ice Mlachine Co., v. Upham, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 197
it was held that an ice machine built on the premises of the
Mechanics'

defendant by the plaintiff in pursuance of a contract

made with the defendant's tenant and fastened to
the ground and to the building in such a manner
that it would be necessary to tear down the buildtion,"
Consent of ing in order to remove the machine, came within
Owner
the words " work and material used in the erection
and alteration of the buildings on the premises," as used in the
statute, so as to give a mechanics' lien, provided that such
work was done with the consent of the owner of the building.
Lien,

"Erection
and Altera-

The Supreme Court of Vermont, following the general rule,
has held that there are no correlative rights between adjoining
property owners as to water percolating through
Waters,
Percolation, earth without a defined channel, but that such
Adjoining
water is to be regarded as a part of the earth, and,
Land Owners therefore, the subject of absolute use and appropriation by owner of the land in which it is.
In the case at issue, S conveyed by warranty deed to W
certain lands and also a spring of water on other land of the
grantor adjoining the portion conveyed. This spring had
been formed by an excavation in the soil about four feet deep.
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Subsequently S sold other land around and above the spring
to J, who dug another spring, or well, at a point above the
plaintiff's land, and the flow of water to the plaintiff's spring
was diminished thereby.
It was held that a bill for an injunction would not lie against
J on the ground that while the warranty deed gave the
plaintiff the right to such water as ,wasactually in his spring,
it did not give him any right to the percolating water before it
reached his spring. Judge Taft dissented, but the ground of
the dissent is not stated: Wheelock v. Jacobs, 40 Atl. p. 41.
RES JUDICATA.

In Gray et al. v. .Aoonan, 53 Pac. (Ariz.) 7, the sheriff had
made an unlawful attachment of goods, for which an action of
trover was brought against him and judgment
Trespass
obtained, which was unsatisfied. This judgment
Against
Sheriff,
was held not to bar a subsequent suit against the
AcBon an sheriff, based on the bond given by him for the
faithful performance of his duties. The
cause of
action in the latter suit was the breach of the bond and not
primarily the trespass. Although the same acts constituting
the trespass on the part of the sheriff make the breach of the
obligation expressed in the bond, they give rise to several and
distinct rights of action.
WILLS.

Testator directed his land to be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between A, B and C. He afterwards made a
codicil revoking the bequest to A and directing
Bequest,
that A should receive $1200 on the final settleRevocation,
Disposition of ment of his estate.

Held, that there was nothing

Revoked

to imply an intention that the revoked share
should go to B and C, although the omission
was probatly due to an oversight, and that A's share should
descend as intestate property: fiinkler et al. v. Simon's et al.
5o N. E. (Ill.) 176.
A testator by will bequeathed to his executors the sum of
$20,000 in trust to pay the interest to E during her life, and
the principal sum, after E's death, to her children.
Bequest,
The testator subsequently made a codicil reciting
Share

Revocation by

the former gift as one to the executors to pay the
interest to E for life and revoking it, and directing
the executors to invest $12,ooo, and to pay the interest to E
for life.
Codicil
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The Chancery Court of New Jersey held that the codicil did
not revoke the gift to the children over after E's life estate,
but simply reduced the amount of the gift, on the ground that
the gift in the codicil was substitutional, and that the substituted legacy was subject to the same conditions as the
original: Lyons v. Clawson, 39 Atl. lO64.
Testator devised land to his executors in trust for R (who
was then married), to pay him the rents and profits as long as
Devise,

he should remain married, but if he should become

Condition
Void as
Against
Pubiic Policy

unmarried during his life, to convey the land to
him in fee. In case R should die married, there
was a limitation over.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that although

conditions whose tendency are to induce husband and wife to
be divorced are void, yet that the circumstances of the case
were to be taken into consideration. In the present case it was
shown that R and his wife had been separated and divorce
proceedings had been instituted between them for some time
prior to the making of the will, that they afterwards remained
separated, and that testator was aware of the fact. Under
these circumstances the condition could not be said to
"encourage" the bringing of a &vorce suit and was therefore
valid: Ransdel v. Boston et at., 50 N. E. I I i.

